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Abstract 
 
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) differ a great deal in both their legal and judicial 
dimensions. Accounting for RTAs means, in good part, to explain those differences. A 
rationalist approach focused on interests, calculations, and utility-maximizing outcomes can 
offer limited insight into those differences. RTA officials do not operate in a vacuum. First, at 
the intra-regional level, they work in environments with established, and often similar, national 
legal and judicial traditions. Those traditions, rather than the EU, provide the frames through 
which officials interpret and solve the regulatory challenges associated with integration: 
officials develop legal frameworks and judicial mechanisms that mirror, in their overall 
character, what is already in place in the member states. But, second, officials are aware of 
RTAs elsewhere in the world – above all, the EU. The EU provides ready-made detailed 
instructions, or scripts, for the formulation of specific laws and judicial processes in other 
RTAs. If consistent with the national traditions in a given RTA, officials often adopt or mimic 
those scripts. Thus, overall, choices about legal and judicial design have little to do with what 
is ‘best’ for trade liberalization and the fulfillment of national interests. They have a lot more to 
do with continuity, legitimacy, and expediency.  
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Introduction 
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) differ a great deal in both the legal and judicial dimensions. 
Accounting for RTAs means, in good part, to explain those differences. A rationalist approach 
focused on interests, calculations, and utility-maximizing outcomes can offer limited insight into 
those differences. RTA officials do not operate in a vacuum. First, at the intra-regional level, 
they work in environments with established, and often similar, national legal and judicial 
traditions. As I have shown in previous work and further elaborate here in light of RTAs 
worldwide, those traditions, rather than the EU itself, provide the frames through which officials 
interpret and solve the challenge of what may be called ‘cognitive misalignment’, or more 
simply put the existence of disparate worldviews. They develop legal frameworks and judicial 
mechanisms that mirror, in their overall character, what is already in place in the member states.  
Second, and more importantly for our purposes in this panel, officials are aware of RTAs 
elsewhere in the world – above all, the EU. The EU provides ready-made detailed instructions, or 
scripts, for the formulation of specific laws and judicial mechanisms in other RTAs. If consistent 
with the national traditions in a given RTA, officials often adopt or mimic those scripts. Choices 
about frames and scripts have little to do with what is ‘best’ for trade liberalization and the 
fulfillment of national interests. They have a lot more to do with continuity, legitimacy, and 
expediency.  
In this paper, I elaborate on the importance of frames and EU scripts for the design of legal 
and administrative systems in RTAs throughout the world. Data comes from six RTAs: the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mercosur, ASEAN’s Free Trade Area (AFTA), the 
Andean Community (CAN), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 
and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).  
 
 
RTAs and the Rationalist Perspective 
Without question, the primary objective of most RTAs is economic. The goal is the integration 
of national economies. This is to be accomplished by way of trade liberalization: by removing 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to the movement of a combination of goods, services, capital, and 
labor. Tariff barriers are primarily taxes levied on imports. Non-tariff barriers include quotas, 
subsidies, fiscal incentives, and cross-national differences in regulatory regimes. Some RTAs 
may have political and other sorts of aspirations. This is certainly the case for the EU, for 
instance. But all – including the EU – remain primarily economic projects. 
RTAs vary, of course, in their specific objectives. Some are primarily concerned with the 
trade of goods. Others add some or all forms of services and capital. Only a few include labor. 
Some impose a common external tariff regime on the member states, others do not. The recent 
explosion of RTAs only added more variety. In this paper, we will focus on seven RTAs. They 
were selected based on their importance, different aspirations, and varied geographical location 
(the Americas, Africa, Europe, and Asia). Table 1 provides a snapshot of their current 
membership and basic objectives: 
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Table 1: The Objectives of RTAs 
 
RTA (start date) Members Objectives 
EU (1957) 
 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden 
 
Common market: goods, 
services, capital, and labor 
with common external tariffs 
Mercosur (1991) 
 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 
 
 
Common market: goods, 
services, capital, and labor 
with common external tariff 
 
 
NAFTA (1993) & 
Side Agreements on 
Labor and the 
Environment 
 
Canada, Mexico, United States Free trade area: goods, 
selected services, all capital, 
no labor 
ASEAN’s AFTA 
(1992) & Associated 
Services and 
Investments 
Agreements 
 
Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam 
Free trade area: most goods, 
most services, and most 
capital 
 
 
Andean Community 
(CAN) (1969) 
Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru Common market: goods, 
services, capital, and labor 
with common external tariff 
 
COMESA (1994) Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
 
Common market: goods, 
services, capital, and labor 
with common external tariff 
 
EFTA (1960) Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland Free trade area: most goods 
(but for agriculture), and (after 
2001) services, capital, and 
labor 
 
 
 
There is now a great deal of comparative research on RTAs (Sbragia 2008). Some of it is not 
concerned with the process of making RTAs but, rather, their impact on internal trade, the global 
economy, key societal groups (e.g., labor, women, migrants), the environment, and sovereignty. 
But a good amount does focus on the crafting of RTAs. Here, two sets of closely related 
questions have received considerable attention. First, how can we explain the specific content of 
the major agreements of RTAs? Why, for instance, does NAFTA target many agricultural 
products? Why, in the section on services, does it not include oil exploration? Second, how do 
RTA officials – understood in this paper to be national representatives involved in the project of 
regional integration and, only in the rare situations when an RTA has supranational institutions, 
officials from those institutions – operate? What motivates them and what are they pursuing?  
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Most of the answers have come from scholars international political economists subscribing 
fully or partially to the rationalist model of human behavior, according to which human beings – 
driven mostly by self-interest – engage in lucid calculations and strategies that ensure the 
maximization of their utility.1 In the case of RTAs, this means accounting for any given 
characteristic in the major agreements by viewing it as the outcome of extensive bargaining 
among purposeful national representatives who, in asymmetrical positions of power vis-à-vis one 
another, work assiduously to advance the interests of their domestic constituents (and, in so 
doing, their own, since they depend on their constituents for reelection).   
Perhaps the best known proponent of this rationalist perspective is Andrew Moravcsik. In his 
view, EU national representatives always go to the bargaining table with a clear mandate: to 
advance the interests of the major economic groups of their countries. Throughout, they remain 
faithful to that mission. “On not a single major issue,” Moravcsik wrote in reference to all major 
agreements in the history of the EU, “did governments take a position openly opposed by a 
major peak industrial, financial, or agricultural interest group” (1998: 475-76). Accurate in their 
calculations, they then strike the best deals for their constituents. These agreements always lie on 
the “Pareto-frontier”, a zone where all decisions “improve welfare for all governments” (1998: 
25) and subject no member state to unexpectedly harmful principles or policies. 
Helen Milner, a second prominent scholar, made a similar argument about RTAs in general 
in an important edited volume on the topic (Mansfield and Milner 1997) “Why,” she asked, are 
RTAs “shaped differently” in “the amount of liberalization accorded each economic sector”? Her 
answer was unambiguous: “the character of regional agreements reflects the rational responses of 
governments to their domestic political situations  . . . I argue that governments craft regional 
trade agreements in an attempt to balance consumer (and thus voter) interests and pressures from 
their private economic agents” (Milner 1997: 77). Most of her collaborators, such as Stephan 
Haggard, agreed: “a theory of regional cooperation  . . . must address the more fundamental 
question of policy preferences and capabilities of the relevant actors  . . .  the content of these 
agreements is primarily determined by bargaining among prospective members” (Haggard 1997: 
21, 31).  
These basic rationalist arguments were followed by numerous empirical analyses of single 
RTAs. Mercosur received considerable attention. Kaltenthaler and Mora argued, for instance, 
that the member states have extracted “the maximum economic and political benefits from 
integration while forgoing as little sovereignty as possible” (Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002: 90, 
92), while Sánchez stressed that “the rebuilding of regionalism in Central America reflects the 
governments’ preferences constrained domestically by their political economy . . . and externally 
by global pressures” (Sánchez 2004: 31). Perhaps the most studied case after the EU, however, 
was NAFTA. Cameron and Tomlin (2000), in probably the most important book on the making 
of the agreement, examined closely the strategies that each negotiating party used to advance 
their agendas. A key finding was that the misalignment in objectives between the Canadian and 
Mexican governments strengthened the bargaining position of the United States. Numerous 
studies followed. In an intriguing analysis, for instance, Ortiz Mena (2006) showed how Mexican 
representatives managed to extract concessions from their American counterparts in key energy 
                                                 
1
 Note that we are not dealing here with the literature on why countries choose to form an RTA (see, for 
example, Mansfield 1998 and Mattli 1999). Our focus is on what they agree on once they have decided to 
join. It is worth pointing out, however, that the literature on the motivations behind the founding of RTAs 
is also heavily shaped by rationalist accounts.  
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sectors by adopting clever (unyielding at first but more open-minded later) negotiation 
techniques.  
These rationalist interpretations of RTAs have certainly not been without their critics. But the 
most important counterarguments have come from scholars of the EU: whether their 
predominantly institutionalist insights can be turned into coherent and comprehensive replies to 
rationalist accounts of integration remains unclear, since they hinge on the EU’s supranational 
character (while most RTAs are intergovernmental). These have included arguments about path 
dependency (Pierson 1996; Ackrill and Kay 2006; Sverdrup 2002; Holzinger and Knill 2002), 
the ability of organizational entities within the EU to accrue power over time at the expense of 
the member states (Heisenberg and Richmond 2002: 204; Alter 1998: 131), and reinforcing loops 
between EU institutions, and between those institutions and their environments (Sandholtz and 
Stone Sweet 1998; Bulmer 1998: 373). Constructivist (Mayer 1998; Laursen 2003), network-
focused (Dreiling 2001), state centric (Malamud 2005), and other sorts of arguments have 
certainly been put forth for the other RTAs. But these have tended to be few and concerned only 
with single RTAs. A sustained alternative response to the rationalist perspective on RTAs, then, 
is still missing. 
In the following sections, I put forth a sociological approach to RTAs. The focus is on the 
practical pursuit of grand objectives. The explanatory variables are frames and scripts, rather that 
self-interest and calculation. My objective is to craft a basic (i.e., widely applicable, empirically-
driven, and related to fundamental aspects of integration) account of integration that departs, in 
spirit, from those rationalist interpretations that have so far dominated the literature.  
 
 
Regional Integration: Misalignment, Frames, and Scripts 
RTAs come with few instructions. Their objective is clear: trade liberalization among the 
member states (for their entire economies or parts of them). But a guidebook for how that 
objective can be pursued in practice does not exist. To use the language of world society scholars 
(Meyer et al. 1997), the ‘worldwide model’ for regional trade liberalization – available at the 
global level and fast diffusing across geographies – is incomplete. One challenge especially is 
left in the open: how to address disparate worldviews among market participants and, once a 
solution is found, how to deal with conflict in the new order. 
The challenge of disparate worldviews is almost overwhelming. Unlike most markets in 
history, RTAs propose that countries merge sections or the entirety of their economies very 
rapidly. The effort entails bringing together populations with different perspectives on reality 
into a single marketplace. Those perspectives include definitional and normative notions about 
objects, actors, and activities in the world. Definitional notions have to do with what things ‘are’ 
in the marketplace and beyond: what is beer? What is a computer keyboard? What does pollution 
mean? Normative notions have to do with what things ‘should be like’ in the marketplace and 
beyond: are inequities in pay between men and women permissible? How should animals in 
slaughterhouses be treated? How should companies report their income? Misalignment in 
perspectives is problematic for free trade in three different ways. First, consumers and producers 
from one country hesitate to buy anything from another country if it does not conform to their 
expectations. Second, domestic laws often formally embody domestic cultural frameworks and 
make the importing of foreign products and services problematic. Third, to the extent that 
domestic producers have to comply with domestic law, misalignment generates different 
production costs. This, in turn, distorts trade flows.  
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RTA officials have been well aware of the problem of disparate worldviews. To resolve it, 
they have turned to regional law. A quick look at RTAs throughout the world shows officials 
veering towards one of two types of solutions. The first is the erection of very complex legal 
systems seeking to standardize in definitional and normative terms vast areas of economic life 
and beyond. We may call this approach interventionist. The second approach is far more 
minimalist. It emphasizes the principle of mutual recognition, according to which the member 
states are asked to accept each other’s standards. The resulting regional legal system is far 
‘thinner’: with far less being subject to standardization, the number of laws is much smaller and 
their content far less ambitious. Not all RTA officials have clearly chosen between these two 
models, of course. Some hybrid approaches exist. 
These differences in law are of great importance. Even if RTA law is partly implemented (as 
is often the case), it subjects countries to enormously different pressures. The interventionist 
model pushes market participants towards a conceptual, formal harmonization of their 
worldviews. The minimalist approach is certainly less intrusive. But it is imposing nonetheless: 
citizens and producers in any given member state must accept multiple worldviews – more 
specifically, the products that embody them – as valid. Their own beliefs, values, and ways of 
doing things are challenged by the coexistence of alternatives. Minimalism, in other words, 
brings about the challenge of pluralism.   
The problem of adjudication follows the erection of standardizing legal systems. Disputes 
over compliance with law always arise. Thus, we see that RTA officials have designed resolution 
mechanisms to deal with such disputes. Once again, they have typically chosen between two 
very different options. The first is the establishment of courts staffed with permanent judges and 
support personnel housed in dedicated physical spaces (offices with libraries, archives, etc.). 
These courts represent a commitment to sorting out regularly over time the meaning of regional 
law – and, therefore, the expectation that there will be frequent disputes over standardization 
brought to these courts. The second option is reliance on ad hoc panels asked to resolve disputes 
as they arise. The composition of these panels changes with each case. Support in terms of 
human resources and physical infrastructure is minimal. A choice to rely on such panels 
indicates a general belief that recourses to official adjudication will be infrequent – either 
because of the low likelihood that disputes will arise or, perhaps more often, because other less 
formal mechanisms are expected to resolve problems. 
Though less immediately obvious than is the case with law, these choices in the judicial 
realm are also of profound consequence. Permanent courts, by way of institutionalizing conflict 
resolution and initiating a corpus of rulings, have the potential to broaden the presence of 
regional law in the public sphere. They ‘amplify’ or add a further layer to the legal system. 
Along with other permanent bodies, they also help RTAs become concrete, tangible entities in 
society. Ad hoc panels achieve the opposite effect. With their more modest profile, they add little 
to regional law or the presence of RTAs in the public eye.   
Social scientists have so far been surprisingly silent about the incomplete nature of the 
integration model available in world society, and the legal and judicial differences among RTAs. 
Yet, given their consequences in their respective member states, those differences deserve 
explanation. From a policy perspective, accounting for them will also highlight the existence of 
multiple paths to integration. 
One could attempt to explain differences among RTAs in a rationalist fashion. But such an 
approach is unlikely to bear much fruit. RTAs all aim to liberalize trade. From the point of view 
of efficiency, one would expect that there be a single formula for the basic characteristics of 
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regional law and the required dispute resolution mechanisms. The fact that RTA officials have 
opted for drastically different formulas suggests that what is efficient in one place is not efficient 
in another. Immediately, we would find ourselves exploring the question of context: what factors 
make one approach efficient in some RTAs but not in others? The answers would most likely 
have little to do with rationality. It is also the case that the legal systems and judicial mechanisms 
of RTAs have often functioned and evolved in ways not predicted by their designers (Alter 2001; 
Duina and Buxbaum 2008; Pierson 1996). Problems of compliance have in turn partly 
undermined their impact (Falkner et al. 2005; Malamud 2005). Such developments would 
undermine any rationalist account for the raison d’etre of those systems and mechanisms. 
I thus propose an altogether different explanation. Our attention should turn to frames and 
scripts. In line with sociological and social-psychological research, by frames I mean collectively 
shared and accepted ways of interpreting situations and problems in life. Frames help individuals 
simplify and make sense of the world (Benford and Snow 2000: 614). When it comes to RTA 
officials in particular, frames determine how those officials approach the problem of market 
building and misalignment in worldviews. How do they understand and make sense of that 
problem? What sorts of solutions are they likely to envisage? Put differently, what do they know 
and feel comfortable with? What is instead outside their worldviews? 
By scripts, in turn, I mean socially available, specific instructions or codes for how to behave 
in certain situations or respond to particular problems as they arise. Scripts are less about 
interpreting the world and more about responding to it. They make navigating through life easier 
by providing already formulated answers to challenges and by endowing adherents with a certain 
degree of legitimacy (Scott and Meyer 1994; Jepperson 1991). Thus, once problems are 
identified – through frames – and particular types of solutions entertained as acceptable, scripts 
provide attractive, detailed answers for actors. Recent work in economic sociology in particular 
has shown how given answers to economic problems ‘diffuse’ across regions of the world 
(Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008).  
Let us now consider the question of law. What determines whether RTA officials opt for 
interventionism or minimalism? In many cases, the answer has to do, first and foremost, with the 
legal traditions that are in place in the member states. In any given RTA, officials typically come 
from countries sharing one of two types of legal environments: civil law or common law. Those 
in the former (primarily countries in continental Europe and their former colonies in Latin 
America, Africa, and Asia) are accustomed to codification and regulation as the appropriate 
responses to the challenges inherent to social life. State intervention through law in this sense is a 
positive matter: a way of enabling things and not only restraining and punishing. Those RTA 
officials operating in common law traditions (as found in the United Kingdom and most of its 
former colonies throughout the world) are instead accustomed to the state laying down basic 
regulatory principles, allowing social life to unfold, and then dealing with conflicts as they arise. 
A priori state intervention is looked upon with suspicion at best.  
These legal environments provide the ‘frames’ through which RTA officials view the 
problem of misalignment in worldviews. When coming from civil law traditions, officials are 
inclined to respond by thinking of it as a legal challenge that calls for a legal response. They will 
talk about the need for ‘harmonization’ of disparate regulatory regimes. And they will 
accordingly engage in the production of extensive definitional and normative legal principles at 
the regional level. The choice will not be a matter of much reflection. It will be, instead, an 
almost instinctive reaction. In foundational agreements and treaties, officials will simply 
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recognize the need for legal intervention. When probed, they will admit that alternative choices 
were hardly entertained. 
In RTAs where common law is the legislative tradition of the member states, officials 
understand the problem of worldview misalignment in quite different terms. In their eyes, the 
problem before them does not require harmonization: differences in national legal traditions can 
coexist within a single marketplace. The task is therefore to ask market participants to embrace 
the principle of mutual recognition. They will accordingly craft a non-intrusive legal system at 
the regional level. Foundational treaties will not mention the problem of harmonization. And 
when asked about their choices, these officials will recognize that alternative choices were 
simply not considered.  
But specific ‘scripts’ also influence the work of RTA officials. Once the problem of 
misalignment is understood, by way of frames, as requiring an interventionist or minimalist 
response, officials ‘scout’ the world for specific, detailed answers. These are the treaties and 
specific laws already in place in other, usually successful, RTAs – in particular, the EU itself. 
Borrowing and transplanting those scripts is a matter of expediency but also a quick way of 
acquiring legitimacy – much like what happens in organizational fields more generally with the 
practice of mimicry and the resulting high degree of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
RTA officials will therefore look at what their counterparts in other RTAs have crafted. These 
‘exchanges’ will be made all the easier by modern technology as well as formal and informal 
channels of communication between RTAs.  
Similar dynamics affect the choice of judicial mechanisms. Why do some RTAs exhibit 
highly institutionalized courts and others RTAs ephemeral ad hoc panels? Officials usually 
tackle judicial matters after the legal ones. As they do, they continue to operate with the same 
frames in mind. They will therefore opt for a judicial solution that complements the legal one. 
Permanent courts with professional staff ready to process large number of cases can be expected 
in interventionist RTAs rich with legal principles intended to harmonize national differences. Ad 
hoc panels are instead the appropriate answer in those RTAs where officials, in line with national 
traditions, have chosen not to engage in extensive codification and normative regulation of the 
world – in RTAs, that is, where conflict over law is expected to be relatively less frequent.  
But, again, scripts also matter here as well. Officials pay close attention to other RTAs, and 
the EU especially, for inspiration and outright borrowing. They model their courts or panels after 
the more successful examples. This again is a matter of convenience as well as legitimacy. 
Transplanting a system that has proven to work elsewhere is easier than devising an entirely new 
one. It is also rather difficult to criticize. 
Now, the world is a complex place. Any given explanatory model thus requires refinement 
and flexibility. The framework outlined here is no exception. The first, and quite important, 
caveat is that there of course exist RTAs where the founding member states have conflicting 
legal traditions. This is the case for NAFTA, for example, where only Mexico is a civil law 
country, as well as EFTA, whose seven founding member states included the United Kingdom 
but also Portugal and other civil law countries. In those RTAs, power differentials determine the 
final choice of legal system. Whichever countries enjoy more power will project their national 
traditions at the regional level. There are, nonetheless, RTAs where there is no clear power 
differential among member states with conflicting traditions. What happens in such cases? What 
tradition is likely to prevail? Here, we will see RTAs exhibiting a blend of approaches – with 
heavy standardization present in some policy areas and not others. Such a blended legal system 
can be supported by either permanent courts or ad hoc panels.  
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We should then acknowledge that late entrants can bring different legal traditions. This has 
been the experience of the EU, for instance, with the arrival of the UK and Ireland. We are 
bound to observe the new countries exerting some pressure to shape things in their direction. 
Depending on their level of influence, this may impact the evolution of regional law and the 
work of courts and panels.  
The third caveat concerns exclusivity. Frames and scripts are not the only variables shaping 
influencing national representatives as they design their RTAs. Other factors – such as member 
states’ concerns with preserving sovereignty, for instance, and even a good amount of calculation 
and strategic thinking – are also at work. The point here is one of relative importance: frames and 
scripts are key variables that drive outcomes in many, very important cases. They need to be a 
central part of any account of regional integration.  
Finally, we should clarify something about objectives. A tempting explanation for 
differences in legal and judicial approaches centers on the ambitiousness of the RTA in question: 
does it extend beyond goods, for instance, to include services, capital, and labor? Within any 
given realm – goods, for instance – does it seek to liberalize the flow of most things or just 
some? It seems reasonable to think that heavier legal systems and adjudication mechanisms will 
be present in more ambitious RTAs. This idea is actually flawed. Differences in approaches are 
very much visible when the comparison is direct and fair: when, in other words, we consider the 
trade of goods (which is an objective of all RTAs) and, within that, of the same sorts of goods, or 
any other sector of the economy. A focus on objectives will not help us understand why this is 
the case.  
 
 
Evidence 
What sort of evidence would support the claim that frames and scripts (EU ones especially) 
matter for the legal and judicial design of RTAs? First, in terms of frames, we would expect to 
see a systematic correspondence between the dominating type of national legal traditions (civil 
law versus common law) in a given group of countries and the type of legal and judicial design 
in the resulting RTAs (interventions with permanent courts versus minimalist with ad hoc 
panels). Second, in terms of scripts, we would expect to see significant instances of cross-RTA 
borrowing, both in terms of law and judicial mechanisms, with the EU playing a special role as a 
model to be emulated. Third, with regards to both frames and scripts, we would expect RTA 
officials to reveal something – in statements made to the press, in treaties, and other venues – 
about the factors influencing their choices of law and adjudication mechanisms as well as their 
own efforts (especially in the case of the EU) to export their perspectives to other RTAs.   
In this section, I present evidence on all three fronts. Attention turns to NAFTA, CAN, and 
Mercosur in the Americas, the EU and EFTA in Europe, ASEAN in Asia, and COMESA in 
Africa. Future studies can consider additional RTAs and examples.  
 
Correspondence 
There is indeed a clear and striking correspondence between dominant national legal traditions 
and the legal and judicial design of RTAs. Table 2 shows this for the seven selected RTAs: 
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Table 2: Dominant National Traditions and the Design of RTAs 
 
 
 
  Minimalist Mixed  Interventionist 
 
Common Law 
Dominance 
 
NAFTA (ad hoc panels ) 
EFTA (ad hoc panels) 
 
  
 
Mixed 
Traditions 
 
  
ASEAN (ad hoc panels) 
COMESA (Court of 
Justice) 
 
 
 
 
Civil Law 
Dominance  
 
   
EU (Court of Justice) 
Mercosur (Permanent 
Review Court) 
CAN (Court of Justice) 
 
 
 
 
Consider the three cases where all of the founding members shared a civil law tradition: the EU, 
Mercosur, and CAN. The EU alone has over time accepted new member states with common law 
traditions: the United Kingdom and Ireland. But these countries joined late (1973), when EU law 
was well established and in full development, and despite attempts by the United Kingdom to 
‘water down’ the legal structure of the EU they have had little influence on the overall character 
of the EU legal system. Since their inception, Mercosur and CAN have only included civil law 
countries.  
Now, in all three cases RTA officials have engaged in massive amounts of legal 
standardization. Anecdotes about the EU’s zealous drive to legislate abound, of course. Though 
often bordering on the amusing, they reflect the far more serious extent to which EU officials 
have sought to harmonize the worldview of market participants. Despite their younger age, much 
the same can be said of Mercosur (launched in 1991) and CAN (launched in 1969). Indeed, all 
three have created relevant bodies charged with this task (the Commission in the EU, the Grupo 
Mercado Común and the Consejo del Mercado Común in Mercosur, and the Comisión in CAN). 
We can measure legislative production (and its harmonizing content) in a number of ways. 
One of the best is simply to look at the number of laws. All three RTAs have foundational 
treaties which foresee the extensive use of secondary legislation for the purpose of market 
building. There are tens of thousands of pages of directives and regulations in the EU. In the case 
of Mercosur, there exist over 500 decisions and over 1,000 resolutions. In CAN, we see around 
700 decisions and 1,150 resolutions. The vast majority of these provide standardizing definitions 
and normative judgments for countless objects, activities, and actors related to a huge array of 
goods, services, investments, and labor issues.  
For a more precise assessment, we can estimate how many definitional (i.e., spelling out the 
essential characteristics of an object, activity, or agent) and normative (i.e., stating the 
desirability of something) passages exist in these legal systems. This can be done by selecting 
key policy areas and, within that, a random and statistically meaningful number of laws for 
Dominant 
National 
Traditions   
RTA Law and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
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coding. We need not do this for all three RTAs. A focus on the EU, the most important, and 
either Mercosur or CAN will suffice to get a sense of what has been happening. Table 3 reports 
the findings for the EU (between 1959 and 2000) and Mercosur (between 1991 and 2000)2 in the 
areas of economics, the environment, and public health.3  
 
 
Table 3: Standardizing Passages in EU and Mercosur Law in Select Policy Areas 
 
 
 
Economics Environment Public Health Total 
 
EU 
# with definitional 
content 
 
2,137 
 
283 
 
84 
 
2,504 
# with normative 
content  
 
13,217 
 
687 
 
561 
 
14,465 
 
Mercosur 
# with definitional 
content 
 
6,638 
 
56 
 
1,550 
 
8,244 
# with normative 
content  
 
11,813 
 
140 
 
8,739 
 
20,746 
Source: Duina (2006) 
 
 
The numbers speak for themselves. RTA officials in both the EU and Mercosur have been very 
busy answering the challenges presented by integration. A closer look at these passages would 
reveal countless aspects of reality being targeted.  
As we would expect, we then see that this intensive legal production has been accompanied 
by the establishment of permanent courts in all three RTAs. CAN set up its Court of Justice from 
1979 to 1984. The EU did the same much earlier, in the 1950s. Mercosur officials did not 
immediately create a permanent institution. But in 2002 with the Olivos Protocol they 
established a permanent court – the Tribunal Permanente de Revisión – to handle disputes. 
The situation in NAFTA is quite different. The United States and Canada both have federal 
common law systems. All states (in the US) and provinces (in Canada) with the exception of 
Louisiana and Quebec have common law systems. Only Mexico, the poorest and weakest 
member state at the bargaining table, has a civil law tradition – though, interestingly, at the 
federal level it also exhibits elements of common law as well. Mexico, we should note as well, 
                                                 
2
 The size of the sample for each policy area was based on a margin of error of  ±10%, a confidence level 
of 95%, and a p value of .5. I controlled for time (decades for the EU, years for Mercosur), given that 
RTA officials tend to produce different sorts of laws as integration progresses.  
3
 The EU classifies its laws by policy area. I used that classification to identify the relevant laws. 
Mercosur officials do not classify laws in the same way. I therefore assigned to them a policy area 
depending on their content. Laws related to economic life were those concerned with the production and 
exchange of goods, labor, capital, and services. For the environment, they were those related to the 
preservation of natural habitats, animal life, eco-systems, and natural resources. For public health, they 
were laws related to the wellbeing of human populations. 
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joined Canada and the United States late: NAFTA in fact builds on CUSFTA, a free trade 
agreement between the United States and Canada signed in 1988. 
What choices did NAFTA officials make regarding law? They did not envision the 
production of an extensive system of secondary law. Instead, the only legal texts are the 
foundational agreement itself and two side agreements – the NAALC on labor and the NAAEC 
on the environment. If we code the content of these agreements for passages that have definition 
and normative content, we quickly realize the absence of any serious efforts to standardize 
reality. There are only 282 definitional passages and 628 normative ones (Duina 2006). Most 
cluster around a few policy areas – such as the national treatment of and market access for goods 
(Chapter 3), agriculture (Chapter 7), and government procurements (Chapter 10). These numbers 
obviously represent a tiny fraction of those we saw in the EU and Mercosur in only three policy 
areas. 
In line with our expectations, NAFTA relies solely on ad hoc dispute resolution panels that 
do little to strengthen, from an institutional perspective, the legal system or NAFTA as a whole. 
The panels’ composition and functions are spelled out in different chapters of the treaty (chapter 
11 for investments, 14 for financial services, 19 for antidumping and countervailing duty matters, 
and 20 for most trade issues). For labor-related matters, the NAALC has its own provisions, 
while the NAAEC does the same for the environment. All are similar, however, in being 
temporary and in issuing rulings that do not set precedents.  
EFTA resembles NAFTA. It has no secondary system of law, and its founding 1960 
convention is very brief. A few annexes to the original convention added very little by way of 
harmonization. Revisions to the convention in 2001 and the adoption of several other, short, 
annexes changed little in terms of the basic approach to regulation. Simply put, the main 
preoccupation of the original member states was with tariff removal. Wide use is made of the 
principle of mutual recognition. As to adjudication, EFTA relies on ad hoc arbitration panels. 
There is an EFTA court but, crucially for our analysis, it has the responsibility of dealing with 
claims related to the incorporation of EU law in the three member states (Norway, Iceland, and 
Liechtenstein) which, starting in 1993, decided to adopt most EU law as it is produced (for 
purposes of easing trade with the EU).  
What, then, are the national legal traditions of the EFTA member states? Membership has 
varied greatly over the years. For our purposes, we should consider the founding members. Here 
we find a dominant common law country, the United Kingdom, accompanied by a series of 
smaller and politically uncoordinated countries with primarily civil law traditions, namely 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, and Portugal. For all intents and purposes, 
EFTA was the brainchild of the United Kingdom, as it moved to take an explicit stance against 
the interventionist model of integration found in the EU model. The United Kingdom finally left 
EFTA in 1973, but by then the legal and judicial architecture had been set. 
ASEAN and COMESA provide us with yet a third picture of integration. Both are RTAs with 
a great variety of national legal traditions. Of the five founding countries of ASEAN, two – 
Malaysia and Singapore – have common law systems.  But the other three – Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia – have civil law traditions.  In COMESA, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Congo 
(among others) have civil law traditions. But Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have (among all 
others) common law traditions. The strong presence of religious law in Libya and Sudan adds a 
further dimension of difference. 
What legal frameworks can we observe in ASEAN and COMESA? We can see mixed 
systems characterized by a combination of mutual recognition and standardization. In ASEAN, 
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for example, the member states issued in 1998 the Framework Agreement on Mutual Recognition 
Arrangements. This was deployed in a variety of industries, ranging from electronics to 
cosmetics. At the same time, by August 2003, the same member states had also developed very 
detailed harmonized standards for 20 priority products groups, including items such as motors, 
engines, condoms, and medical rubber gloves. A large number of procedural and safety standards 
were also developed for the medical and drug industries. The adoption of ASEAN’s Policy 
Guideline on Standard and Conformance in 2005 provided further impetus for harmonization. 
Without question, then, ASEAN’s legal system displays a rather mixed response to the 
challenges of standardization. 
COMESA officials followed a similar path. The foundational treaty foresees the production 
of harmonizing secondary law, but only in certain policy areas, such as economic and social 
development. In other areas, such as pharmaceuticals and certain aspects of quality standards for 
all kinds of products, member states are asked to respect the principle of mutual recognition. In 
practice, this has meant extensive standardization in certain policy areas and not others. In 2004, 
for instance, the member states agreed to a wide range of standardizing principles in the area of 
competition (anti-competitive behaviors, mergers and acquisitions, and consumer protection). 
But in other areas, such as energy for example, mutual acceptance of standards and practices is 
expected. As is the case for ASEAN, then, we observe a rather mixed legal approach in 
COMESA. 
As to judicial arbitration, officials in ASEAN have chosen to rely on ad hoc dispute 
resolution mechanisms while their counterparts in COMESA on a permanent court of justice 
established in1994. Given the mixed legal system of each RTA, either system of adjudication 
would have been in line with the framework for integration set out in this paper. 
 
 
Borrowing 
On numerous and important occasions, RTA officials have ‘borrowed’ extensively from each 
other. The faithful, sometimes verbatim, adoption of texts and directions for the functioning of 
RTAs suggests that expediency and a desire to ‘look’ legitimate by resembling another, 
successful, RTA – rather than a careful, exploration of what might serve an RTA best – have 
driven officials in their efforts to liberalize trade. I will focus here on some of the most telling 
instances: how officials from COMESA, CAN, and Mercosur copied directly from the EU to set 
up their RTAs’ legal and judicial systems.  
Let us turn to COMESA first. There, despite operating in dramatically different conditions, 
officials have directly copied the EU when it comes to both law and adjudication. Article 10 of 
the COMESA founding treaty establishes three types of secondary laws. Exactly as it happens in 
the EU, these are ‘regulations’, ‘directives’, and ‘decisions’ (Article 249 of the Treaty of the 
European Union [TEU]). The characteristics of each are, in turn, identical to those of the EU. 
More specifically, regulations are binding in their entirety on all member states, effective on the 
date of their publication in the Official Gazette of the Common Market (in the EU, the equivalent 
is the Official Journal of the EU). Directives are binding as to their results, but not their means. 
The member states can choose how to implement them. And decisions are binding upon the 
entities being addressed. These are very specific types of legal instruments. COMESA officials 
could have certainly opted for different legal instruments. Instead, they turned without hesitation 
to the EU. 
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The direct borrowing continued with the court of justice. The jurisdiction and function of the 
COMESA court are laid out in article 23-30 of the founding treaty. In most respects, they are the 
same as for the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Both courts have the overall function of 
ensuring adherence to law in the interpretation and application of the founding treaties 
(COMESA Articles 23 and TEU Article 220). To that end, both courts have the power to hear 
references from member states against one another or the regulatory/executive institutions of 
each RTA in case of suspected legal infringements (COMESA Article 24 and TEU articles 227 
and 230). Both courts can hear a reference from the executive institutions of their RTA against a 
member state believed not to be observing its obligations as concerns the treaty or secondary law 
(COMESA Article 25 and TEU Article 226). Both courts also have the power to hear a reference 
from a person who is a resident of a member state concerning the legality of a national law (in 
light of RTA law) or an RTA law (COMESA Article 26 and TEU Article 230). And the 
decisions of both courts are superior to those of national courts.4 
Officials from CAN have followed a similar path. They have devised a secondary legal 
system akin to that of the EU. Like EU regulations, there are resolutions “which will be directly 
applicable in Member Countries as of the date they are published in the Official Gazette of the 
Agreement, unless they indicate a later date.” And as is the case with EU directives, in CAN 
there are decisions, which (when stipulated) require incorporation into national law (Article 3 of 
the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement [TCJ]).  
CAN officials then set up a court of justice that, in terms of jurisdiction, is almost a carbon 
copy of the ECJ. Article 17 of the TCJ gives the court the power to hear grievances from the 
member states about community law. Article 23 gives the court the power to hear claims from 
the General Secretariat about non-compliance by a member state. Article 24 grants the court the 
power to hear grievances from a member state about another member state’s failure to comply 
with community law. Article 25 recognizes the court’s power to hear claims from individual 
citizens of the member state as they relate to community law. And Article 35 states that national 
courts must adopt the court’s interpretations of community law in their sentencing. This is not an 
inactive court, we might add. It is the third most active international court, after the ECJ and the 
European Court of Human Rights. It is also a very effective court, at least in the realm of 
intellectual property, with over 1,200 consequential rulings (Helfer, Alter, and Guerzovich  2008: 
1-2).  
As it happened, Mercosur officials did not transpose the EU’s judicial model in their RTA. 
For instance, individuals cannot bring their claims to Mercosur’s tribunal. Nor did they lay out a 
system of secondary laws that faithfully resembles that of the EU. For example, according to 
Article 40 of the Treaty of Ouro Preto, both decisions and resolutions require incorporation in the 
legal systems of the member states. But emulation has nonetheless happened. It has taken a more 
specific sort of form: the verbatim copying of sections, or the entire text, of EU directives and 
regulations.  
An illustrative example is Mercosur Resolution 54/92 of 1992, which lays out in great detail 
the safety requirements of toys. The resolution covers every possible aspect related to safety, 
including physical, chemical, and electrical risks. It lists exceptions (such as Christmas 
decorations). In every regard – specific language and words, number and order of articles and 
sub-articles in the relevant annex, section titles, quantitative restrictions and guidelines (for 
instance, about lead or mercury), requirements for warning labels, and so on – it is an exact 
                                                 
4
 This is explicitly stated in COMESA Article 29. In the case of the EU, this has been established not by 
treaty but by way of several court cases (the most important being Costa vs. ENEL, 1964).  
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replica of EU Directive 88/378 of 1988. Of course, borrowing is often done best when done 
discreetly. Hence, the resolution makes no reference whatsoever to the EU directive.  
 
Statements 
Have RTA officials revealed, in their statements, something about the frames and scripts guiding 
them in their choices of law and adjudication mechanisms? If active in influencing officials in 
other RTAs, have they openly described their initiatives? 
Let us consider frames first. Canadian and American officials certainly made it clear from the 
outset that they would approach the problem of misalignment in worldviews in NAFTA with 
only one possible solution in mind: mutual recognition (Fried 1994). They were open, vocal, and 
matter-of-fact about the impossibility of following the European example (Baer 1991: 148). 
Some politicians and activists did push for uniformity in health, safety, and environmental 
regulations. But “officials in all three countries” working on drafts of the texts were “insist[ent] 
on the limited nature of NAFTA” (Baer 1991: 148). Standardization was simply not an option. 
When asked directly about their mindset in an interview with the author, an attorney working in 
the United State Trade Representative Office during the NAFTA negotiations answered as 
follows: 
 
It would have been unrealistic for us to achieve anything like the EU legal structure 
in North America . . . we did not think about it much because it was not a possibility 
in North America . . . it wasn’t in the cards; it wasn’t even a choice . . . the non-
interventionist nature of the NAFTA text made it a lot easier for the US government 
to  proceed – it implied that the US did not have to make too many legal changes . . . 
that was a positive thing: that NAFTA did not require much changing of US law.5 
 
This limited perspective, we should note, did not escape the attention of journalists and 
academics alike. As Glenn, a legal scholar of trade law, observed, most of North America  
“adheres to the common law tradition . . . there would be no need, because of North American 
circumstances, for a central policy of uniformization or harmonization of laws  . . . the design 
principle of NAFTA would really be that of subsidiarity.” In NAFTA, Glenn continued, it was 
therefore “necessary” for officials to ensure that the law would allow for a “dynamic between the 
general and the particular” (Glenn 2001: 1791-1792). 
We can contrast the assertions of the US attorney with the words of Manuel Olarreaga6 – a 
central player in the evolution of law in Mercosur – during an interview with the author. When 
asked why he thought an interventionist approach was needed, he replied with slight annoyance 
at having to address such an obvious matter: 
 
It was necessary for us to have laws at the Mercosur level. It was not a question. If 
you have a single economic market, you need to introduce uniformity, to harmonize, 
you must have laws to coordinate and regulate the action of participants . . .  
                                                 
5
 Telephone interview with the author, February 2004. The attorney requested that his name not be used. 
 
6
 Director of the Dipartimento de Normativa (Law Department), Secretaría del Mercosur. The interview 
took place in Montevideo, Uruguay, in July 2003. 
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otherwise there is chaos, and the will of the stronger prevails. It would be absurd not 
to have laws for us, simply absurd (italics added).  
 
The passage could not capture better the mindset of the civil law legislator, whose distinctive 
preoccupation is to bring order to society. This is a special kind of order, of course, one that is 
necessitated by the conflicts that arise when thick national legal traditions are brought together in 
a single geographic space. Olarreaga’s perspective was echoed by María Juana Rivera, an 
important player in shaping Mercosur laws in a large number of industrial and agricultural 
sectors, during an interview with the author.7 In her view, integration has highlighted differences 
in quality, safety, health, environmental, and other standards across the four member states, with 
Argentina typically sporting the most stringent approaches. “Those differences have posed 
problems, they have acted as obstacles to commerce among the member states,” she noted, “and 
we must continue to work towards their elimination.”  
We can find no clearer evidence of the civil law mindset of Mercosur official, however, than 
in the very opening of the founding Treaty of Asunción. In Article 1, in a passage that we could 
not possibly find in the NAFTA text, we read that “the Member States commit themselves to the 
harmonization of their laws in the pertinent areas, so as to strengthen the process of integration.”  
We find very similar language in the EU and CAN founding documents. How did EU 
officials understand the problem before them? Article 10 of the original version of the Treaty of 
the European Economic Community (TEEC) of 1957 gives legislative powers to the 
Commission on the following bases: it can propose laws whenever “it finds that a difference 
between the provisions laid down by law, regulation, or administrative action in the Member 
States is distorting the conditions of competition in the common markets and that the resultant 
distortion needs to be eliminated” (Article 101 of the TEEC, italics added).  Differences, then, 
between national legal systems are problematic and must be addressed through “the 
approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for the proper functioning of 
the common market” (Article 3 of the TEEC).  
The term ‘harmonization’ appears, in turn, throughout CAN’s Cartagena Agreement. In a 
document that is approximately 36 pages, we find 17 direct references to the term or its 
derivative ‘harmonizing’. An entire chapter is titled “Harmonization of economic policies”. A 
number of passages resemble Article 54, where we read that “the Member Countries shall 
coordinate their development plans in specific sectors and shall gradually harmonize their 
economic and social policies, with a view to achieving the integrated development of the area 
through planned actions.” Indeed, CAN’s parliament is established with a clear, primary mission: 
“to promote the harmonization of Member Country legislation” Article 42(f). There is no doubt 
that CAN officials brought their civil law frames of mind with them as they set out to build a 
single market across their countries. 
What about scripts? RTA officials have been understandably hesitant to acknowledge 
borrowing from other RTAs. But on occasion they have revealed their reliance on readily 
available instructions and models. EU officials, in turn, have openly discussed their efforts to 
encourage adoption of their standards abroad. We consider here a few representative examples.  
                                                 
7
 National Coordinator for Argentina for Mercosur’s Subgrupo de Trabajo Nº3 (Technical Regulation and 
Evaluation of Conformity). Mercosur’s various subgroups aid the Grupo Mercado Común in drafting 
resolutions. The interview took place in Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 2003. 
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Recall COMESA’s court of justice. As we saw, despite the enormous differences between 
the African and the European settings, it was made nearly identical in jurisdictional terms to the 
ECJ. Did COMESA officials ever acknowledge their extensive reliance on the EU model? Not in 
1994, when the basic design of the court was set. But they did so in 1997, when COMESA 
Acting Secretary Erastus Mwencha informed the public that the member states’ ministers of 
legal affairs and attorneys would be meeting later in the week to finally decide on the day-to-day 
operations of the court. As he stressed, the delegates would not be starting from scratch. A 
ministerial “task force” (led by the Chairman of the COMESA Council of Ministers of Justice 
and several national attorney generals) had already visited the EU to ‘study’ how its court 
operated (Africa News 1997). The president and the members of the ECJ actually hosted the task 
force (EU Press Release No. 67/97).8 Their report, Mwencha added, would be examined closely 
prior to deliberations later in the week. It is of course important to see exchanges such as these as 
part of a broader relationship between the EU and COMESA, where the former has regularly 
contributed money and technical expertise to the latter for what it calls ‘institutional 
strengthening’.9 
Officials in CAN have also openly recognized their reliance on the EU for guidelines and 
instructions. In 2004, for instance, Andean Community Secretary General Allan Wagner Tizón 
emphasized in a speech given at the opening of a ‘workshop’ on integration sponsored by the 
European Commission his hope that CAN ”can continue to count on very important European 
collaboration in the deepening of our integration movement and the perfecting of our 
institutions.”10 Indeed, following the adoption of the 1993 Regional Framework Agreement for 
Cooperation, they described on many occasions the EU’s willingness to provide them with 
“technical assistance to the Andean regional construction process” (BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts 1997). EU officials themselves have been forthcoming about their efforts to shape 
things in CAN. The EU is the leading donor in the region (pouring in almost half a trillion euros 
during 2002-2006 alone). Some of those funds have gone directly into influencing legislation.  
For instance, as the EU Commission’s External Affairs Internet site reports, in 2004 €4 million 
of aid to CAN was approved for the “the setting up of a common agricultural policy, 
harmonisation of legislation and of statistical information instruments, and the implementation of 
convergent standards.”11  
Mercosur officials have in turn quite openly welcomed the EU’s input into standardization. 
In 2004, like their CAN counterparts, they accepted €4 million as part of the EU program on 
Harmonisation of Technical Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformity Assessment 
Procedures. In 2003, they accepted €2 million to help them develop appropriate statistical tools. 
EU officials themselves have been open about their policy to pressure Mercosur officials to copy 
EU law. Consider this passage from a recent report by the EU Commission’s Latin America 
Directorate (Mercosur Desk) strategy for increasing EU-Mercosur trade during the period 2002-
2006: 
 
                                                 
8
 Available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communiques/cp97/cp9767en.htm (accessed April 9, 2008).  
9
 See, for instance, the EU Commission’s report annual report on external assistance for 2004 
(Commission of the European Communities 2005: 22-23)  
10
 For the text of the speech, see CAN’s Internet site (accessed on April 9, 2008): 
http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/press/speeches/wagner7-6-05.htm 
11
 See (accessed on April 9, 2008): http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/la/news/ip04_63.htm 
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In the area of competition the EU is stimulating Mercosur to adopt legislation on 
competition which is basically inspired by the EU competition policy. Mercosur will 
create the Competition Authority and in our negotiation for the Association Agreement 
a co-operation will be established between the two authorities. A [sic] technical 
assistance could be provided to Mercosur (Commission of the European Communities 
2002: 24, emphasis added). 
 
And Mercosur officials have also admitted to taking advantage of far simpler tools to learn 
and borrow from the EU as well as elsewhere. Thus, when asked by the author about 
Mercosur legal passages that fully replicate EU passages, María Juana Rivera recognized her 
and her colleagues’ strong interest in what is available in world society. As she put it, “yes, 
we look around, especially with the Internet, and study different regulatory approaches in 
different parts of the world; we then borrow from the EU but also other international 
organizations, adapt them to our own circumstances, and then use them.” This approach may 
be seen by some as the most efficient way of crafting the best legislation to build a common 
market. When it translates into direct replication, however, it more likely signals preference 
for expediency over what may be optimal for the RTA in question. 
 
 
Reflections 
Regional integration presents formidable challenges. No guidebook exists for how those 
should be met. This is especially the case for the problem of misalignment in the worldviews 
of market participants. RTA officials have accordingly responded in dramatically different 
ways. Some have engaged in extensive legal standardization and have established permanent 
courts for judicial arbitration. Others have adopted a far more minimalist approach, both in 
terms of law and adjudication mechanisms. A third group shows a more mixed approach. 
These differences have real and far reaching consequences for life in those RTAs. 
I have offered a sociological account for the observable differences in the legal and 
judicial architectures of RTAs. I paid special attention to frames – specifically, the existing 
legal traditions in the member states of an RTA, which shape and limit officials’ views of 
what should be done to address disparate worldviews – and the borrowing of scripts from 
others RTAs, especially the EU.  
This paper, then, is a rebuttal to rationalist interpretations of RTAs emphasizing 
calculation, bargaining, and the clairvoyant pursuit of self-interest. RTAs offer continuity with 
what is in place in a specific region and remind us of the powerful human tendency to mimic 
what others are doing. RTAs are like trees with deep roots in the ground.  And they are social 
products, designed by people who receive their inspiration from, and are influenced by, what 
surrounds them. 
Any non-rationalist interpretation of integration efforts is bound to raise questions about 
their raison d’etre. If they are not instrumental in maximizing their creators’ interests, why 
should they exist? Institutionalist and neofunctionalist arguments about the EU and other 
international organizations have already tackled this question. Their insights apply to most 
RTAs. First, we must question the presumed presence of coherent and well articulated 
national interests. What if there are multiple, conflicting, and unclear interests in any given 
member state? There might not be a set of preferences that, in the first place, need satisfaction. 
Second, organizations almost always take on a life of their own after their establishment. In 
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the process, they start fulfilling new needs and objectives – ones that are often not aligned 
with the interests of their creators. They unquestionably serve a function, therefore, though 
not the one envisioned by rationalists. And, third, let us recall that most institutions in society 
amount to compromises between logic and the complexities of social life. No institution exists 
in a vacuum. RTAs are no exception. We should therefore not question their existence on the 
bases of their ‘irrational’ qualities. 
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